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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
Dieses Working Paper analysiert Revisionen von Ausbildungsentscheidungen in der dualen 
Ausbildung. Im Gegensatz zu früherer ökonomischer Forschung analysieren wir nicht nur 
Abbruchentscheidungen, sondern beziehen explizit auch andere choices nach der Auflösung eines 
Ausbildungsvertrages ein. In Anlehnung an frühere Arbeiten von Neuenschwander (96, 98, 
Neuenschwander et al. 99) unterscheiden wir nach Auflösung eines Ausbildungsvertrages zwischen 
Abbruch (dropout), Wechsel (change) und Rückkehr ins allgemein bildende Schulsystem (upgrade). 
Die empirische Analyse wurde unter Verwendung eines deutschen Datensatzes aus dem Jahr 2002 
durchgeführt. Als Kontrollgruppe verwenden wir die Auszubildenden, deren Lehrvertrag aufgrund 
eines Bankrotts ihres Ausbildungsbetriebes aufgelöst wurde, und nehmen an, dass sie ihre 
Ausbildung ohne dieses Ereignis abgeschlossen hätten. 
 
In einer competing risks Spezifikation eines hazard rate Modelles finden wir, dass finanzielle 
Beweggründe wie etwa die Opportunitätskosten einer Ausbildung oder finanzielle Schwierigkeiten 
entscheidende Determinanten des Ausbildungsabbruchs zu sein scheinen. Gleichzeitig scheinen 
lokale Arbeitsmarktbedingungen die Entscheidungen zu beeinflussen: in Regionen mit hoher 
Arbeitslosigkeit sind die Hazards des Verbleibs im Schulsystem signifikant niedriger. Zudem 
werden die drei unterschiedlichen Entscheidungen von unterschiedlichen Determinanten getrieben. 
Dieses Ergebnis zeigt, dass es nötig ist, zwischen den verschiedenen Verbleibsmöglichkeiten zu 
unterscheiden, statt ausschließlich auf die Abbruchentscheidung zu fokussieren.    
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Abstract
Previous research on educational decisions has almost exclusively
focused on individual decisions to start a particular education. At the
same time, the decision to revise an educational choice has hardly been
analyzed, unless it is the decision to drop out. However, dropping out
is only one possibility of revising an educational choice. In this paper,
we distinguish three different educational revisions, namely, dropping
out, changing and upgrading. We analyze the determinants of these
three different choices in apprenticeship training using hazard rate
models for the empirical analysis. In a first research step, we carry
out a simple hazard rate estimation of the decision to drop out vs.
staying in the educational system because dropping out is associated
with considerable risks, unlike the other two choices. Our most im-
portant finding here is that dropout decisions seem to be driven to
a considerable amount by financial considerations such as the oppor-
tunity cost of apprenticeship training or financial distress, determi-
nants that could rarely be analyzed in previous research due to lack
of information. In a competing risks specification of the different ed-
ucational choices, we find additional regional-level impact factors and
remarkable differences in the determinants of the different choices.
Less favorable local labor market conditions lead to lower hazards of
staying within the educational system. These results underline the
importance of distinguishing between the different choices instead of
focusing exclusively on dropping out as one possible choice.
∗University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), Swiss Lead-
ing House on Economics of Education: Firm Behavior and Training Policies and UC
Berkeley, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment
†University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) and Swiss
Leading House on Economics of Education: Firm Behavior and Training Policies
1
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Literature 3
3 Estimation Framework 5
3.1 Theoretical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4 Background and Data 8
4.1 Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3 Selection and Construction of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5 Estimation Results 14
5.1 Simple Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2 Competing Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6 Conclusion 20
References 23
A Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 27
B Additional Estimation Results 29
2
List of Tables
1 Choice by Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Choice by prior level of schooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Choice by Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4 Choice by Region of Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5 Simple Hazard Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6 Competing Risks Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7 Variables: Data Sources and Description . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9 Simple Hazard Rates, full results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10 Simple Hazards, logit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
11 Competing Risks Model, complementary log-log . . . . . . . . 31
3
1 Introduction
The determinants and consequences of high school dropout behavior have
received considerable attention from researchers in the past. An extensive
literature examines the long-term development of dropout rates (Heckman
and LaFontaine 2007), possible determinants of the decision to drop out of
high school (Card and Lemieux 2001), and its long-term consequences (Ore-
opoulos 2007). Much less attention has been paid to the possibility that
youths may revise an educational decision in different directions. Basically,
there are three different possibilities: they can change to another schooling
choice, they can go to a more challenging educational choice or they can
drop out from the educational system and either work as unskilled workers
or end up unemployed.1 We call the different choices changing, upgrading
and dropping out, respectively.
While the first two groups (changers and upgraders) are rather unproblem-
atic with respect to long-term labor market consequences of their decisions,
the last group (dropouts) runs higher risks. Increasing qualification require-
ments and technical progress give dismal prospects to the unskilled and low-
skilled labor force. Additionally, integration into the global economy leads
to a lowered demand for unskilled labor (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat des Bun-
desministeriums fu¨r Wirtschaft und Technologie 2006). Empirical studies for
the UK and the USA (e.g., Fabbri et al. 2003) seem to suggest that openness
increases the elasticity of labor demand, probably especially for low-skilled
labor.2 Besides, wages for unskilled workers are considerably lower. Another
risk for educational dropouts is the fact that they lack the requirements for
many further education programs. In fact, Oreopoulos (2007) finds that the
welfare loss from dropping out from compulsory school is large and proba-
bly not outweighed by lower costs because of the dropout decision according
to his calculations. Hence, there should be a pronounced interest in under-
standing the reasons why youths drop out of education as opposed to other
educational revisions.
For our empirical analysis of the decision to revise an educational choice, we
1This is a simplified approach, which is nevertheless based on previous work, e.g. in
several articles by Neuenschwander (1996, 1998, 1999).
2There are two possible reasons for this phenomenon: more trade leads to more com-
petitive goods markets, and multinational firms’ global production networks enable them
to shift their production abroad more easily. The results are higher unemployment rates
on less flexible labor markets (as the German one) for low-skilled workers. It seems that
more flexible labor markets tend to end up with higher inequality in labor incomes. Barba
Navaretti et al. (2003) use European panel data and also find that in a given country,
foreign-owned enterprises adjust their employment systematically faster than domestic
ones.
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use a German data set on revisions of the decision to enter apprenticeship
training. The advantage of this data set is that the different choices can
be very clearly distinguished, instead of focusing solely on dropouts as one
educational revision. We further add to the existing literature by taking into
account various non-financial costs of apprenticeship training as an invest-
ment in human capital, as well as financial opportunity costs and perceived
bad prospects after finishing the apprenticeship training. This relates to re-
cent work by Dynarski (2008) who finds that scholarship programs lowering
the costs of a college degree significantly decrease college dropout rates. Also,
Maurin and Xenogiani (2007) find that higher benefits of education (in their
case, the possibility to avoid military service for males) led to lower dropout
rates from high school. In addition, our data set contains direct questions
about the reasons why the individuals dropped out of their training. We
believe that this is a big advantage over existing research that mainly hy-
pothesizes about possible reasons for dropout behavior.
For the empirical analysis, we use two different types of duration analyses,
namely, a simple hazard rate estimation and a competing risks model. In
the simple hazard rate estimation, we analyze the decision to drop out of ap-
prenticeship training as compared to staying within the educational system
(i.e. upgrading or changing) because dropping out can be seen as the riskiest
educational choice. We find a high importance of monetary reasons to drop
out. The higher the apprenticeship wage is relative to the wage for unskilled
workers, the lower is the hazard of dropping out. Also, ex-apprentices who
named bad income prospects or financial distress as the main reasons to drop
out had significantly higher hazards of dropping out. We also confirm results
from earlier studies that individuals with a higher previous level of schooling
have significantly lower hazards of dropping out.
In the competing risks model, we use the fact that there are apprentices
in the sample whose contract was terminated because of a bankruptcy of
their firm and assume that they would have completed their apprenticeship
successfully without this event. Here, we analyze the decisions to enter the
three different educational choices of dropping out, upgrading and changing.
While the results for the financial impact factors are confirmed, we find in
addition that several regional-level variables significantly affect these deci-
sions. More favorable conditions on the local labor market for apprentices
(i.e. more places available per seeker) lead to a signficantly higher hazard
of changing. Also, a higher local unemployment rate leads to significantly
lower hazard ratios of changing and upgrading. These results confirm earlier
findings on the importance of local labor market conditions of educational
choices. However, the most stable and probably most important result is the
importance of financial impact factors for an individual’s decision to drop
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out, which is confirmed in all specifications.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Part 2 provides a brief
literature review. Part 3 presents theoretical considerations and the estima-
tion framework for our empirical analysis. Part 4 gives some background
information presents the main institutional features of the German educa-
tional system with a special emphasis on apprenticeship training, introduces
the data set that we used and descriptive statistics. Part 5 presents and dis-
cusses our estimation results, while part 6 concludes and sketches an agenda
for future research on the topic.
2 Literature
There is quite a substantive body of research on high school dropouts in the
United States, but considerably less on revisions of educational choices. How-
ever, we think that the findings from the US studies on high school dropouts
are relevant for our paper as well because they focus on the riskiest educa-
tional choice. Whenever there is evidence from research on dropouts from
apprenticeship training, we discuss it briefly as well. The existing evidence
on dropout determinants has focused (inter alia) on personal characteristics,
risky behavior, family background, peer effects and regional labor markets,
but only rarely on costs and benefits.
The studies typically find that more able individuals are less likely to drop
out (see, for instance, Bishop and Mane 2001 for the United States or Bradley
and Lenton 2007 for the United Kingdom). The same seems to be true for
apprentices where all studies report that youths with a higher level of previ-
ous schooling are less likely to drop out (see, for example, Alda 2003). The
importance of schooling can be due to two reasons: on the one hand, longer
schooling should be associated with more ability and hence lead to less school-
ing problems, which can subsequently lead to the decision to quit the train-
ing because of high non-monetary costs. On the other hand, more schooling
seems to lead to better decision-making abilities (Cutler and Lleras-Muney
2006), so individuals with more schooling make probably better educational
decisions, resulting in less matching problems and consequent dropout de-
cisions. Additionally, youths with more prior schooling have in general a
larger set of choices available, so they are probably less often forced to start
an apprenticeship just because it was the only offer that they received. This
probably also leads to better matches and less resulting dropouts.
In general, the studies from the United States and the United Kingdom find
important differences in behavior with respect to ethnicity. While they find
that members of minorities are less likely to drop out, the results are the op-
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posite for apprenticeship training in the German-speaking countries. Blacks
and hispanics are found to have a higher probability of high school gradua-
tion (Nguyen et al. 2006), and members of ethnic minorities are also found
less likely to drop out of post-secondary education in the UK (Bradley and
Lenton 2007). However, members of ethnic minorities seem to fare worse than
natives in the apprenticeship training system of the German-speaking coun-
tries. Neuenschwander (1999) finds in a descriptive study that apprentices
without native citizenship are more likely to drop out, Stalder and Schmid
(2006) find that natives are significantly more likely to continue their edu-
cation, and Scho¨ngen (2003) reports that fewer ex-apprentices with foreign
parents are still planning to continue their education.
The literature on high school dropouts has in most cases not focused on
the timing of the dropout decisions. For the apprenticeship dropouts, pre-
vious research has established that most terminations take place during an
early stage of the training, and this also seems to be an indicator for match-
ing problems: many youths say that they did not have enough information
about their training firm (Stalder and Schmid 2006).
A bad working atmosphere, especially clashes with the instructor and/or col-
leagues rank among the most frequently cited reasons for a termination on
firm level (Scho¨ngen 2003, Neuenschwander et al. 1996, Stalder and Schmid
2006). This provides evidence for matching-related problems: apprentices
want to change if the perceived costs are lower in another firm or occupa-
tion, hence, in a better match.
The regional labor market is another possible impact factor on educational
decisions. Card and Lemieux (2000) find that higher regional unemployment
rates lead to a rise in high school completion rates. In contrast, Neuen-
schwander (1999) finds that there are many dropouts in fields where there
are abundant employment opportunities for unskilled workers. The short-
term financial gains seem to lead the apprentices to not taking into account
long-term implications of their decision. This can be seen as a hint towards
the importance of time preference in education-related decision making. Also,
this finding underlines the importance of economic incentives that can have
adverse impacts on educational outcomes.
Revisions of educational decisions are a complex phenomenon and one reason
for the partly contradictory results could be the fact that these studies have
only focused on dropping out as one educational revision. However, the im-
portance of decision-making abilities, resulting matching problems and eco-
nomic incentives, for example adverse local labor market conditions, seems
to be confirmed by all the presented results.
In the following section, we provide theoretical considerations for the differ-
ent choices of changing, upgrading and dropping out that we identified earlier
4
on, and we derive testable hypotheses.
3 Estimation Framework
3.1 Theoretical Considerations
The economic theory of human capital as pioneered by Becker (1962) predicts
that a rational agent will invest in education (as in any other asset) only if it
yields a positive net present value (NPV). Future costs and earnings streams
can be discounted in order to make different alternatives comparable and to
identify the optimal one. For several available choices, an individual will pick
the one that yields the highest net present value.
As we analyze the decision to revise educational choices, we have to slightly
adjust this framework and incorporate learning about job or occupation char-
acteristics into the decision framework. A characteristic of educational de-
cisions is that decisionmakers typically have only incomplete information
about costs and benefits related to their choice. Apprentices will revise an
educational choice after learning more about its characteristics if the updated
expected utility flows outside this choice exceed the updated expectations of
their current choices plus the costs of changing. A choice that may initially
have seemed profitable might ceteris paribus become unprofitable from an
individual’s point of view because of higher than initially expected costs or
lower than expected benefits.
However, we expect different impact factors for the different choices. Chang-
ers should in general have realized that the NPV of their investment is posi-
tive. So, we expect a higher importance of matching-related cost factors for
them. For upgraders, the NPV of their investment in education should also
be positive in general, but they are probably more likely to be underchal-
lenged by their apprenticeship. For dropouts as the last choice possibility,
the NPV of their investment should not be positive, either due to the fact
that their costs are too high or their benefits too low, why we expect general
cost-and benefit-related impact factors to be more important for them.
Incorporating the idea of learning and updating expectations leads to the
prediction that the hazard rates from a started apprenticeship to any desti-
nation will probably fluctuate with duration in a non-monotonic way. During
the initial learning period, apprentices (and firms) learn about the quality
of the match and will probably only remain in a satisfactory match (cf. Jo-
vanovic 1979 for matching on the labor market). As only these satisfactory
matches survive, the number of revisions will probably decrease after the ini-
tial learning period, leading to lower hazards later during the apprenticeship.
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At the same time, the time period until the first returns from the appren-
ticeship will be realized decreases and the time period in which costs of the
apprenticeship occur decreases. This should also lead to lower hazards to
any educational choice later during the apprenticeship training.
Wheeler (2001) shows in a matching model that thicker labor markets lead to
better matching between workers and firms due to lower search costs. This
leads to higher productivity, higher inequality (in pay between different skill
groups) and higher expected returns to skill. Hence, apprentices in thicker
labor markets should have more incentives to complete their training (c.p.)
than their counterparts in areas where the labor market conditions are less
favorable. We therefore expect higher hazards of dropping out and lower
hazards of changing and upgrading in regions with unfavorable labor market
conditions.
3.2 Methods
The structure and available information of the data set offer the possibility
to carry out different types of analyses. As we are interested in the timing of
the decision to quit an already started apprenticeship training, we estimated
various survival analysis models.3
Simple Hazard Rates
We started our analysis with a simple hazard analysis of the decision to
switch to a different choice within the educational system (i.e., to change or
to upgrade) vs. dropping out of it. The information on the timing of the
decision to quit the apprenticeship training is available in discrete time (i.e.,
during probation, later in the first year, in the second, third, and fourth year).
Hence, we have grouped data and use a complementary log-log specification
for estimation.
Following Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), we specify the discrete time hazard
as
h(x, t) = 1− exp[−exp(x′ijβ + φ(t))] (1)
where φ(t) describes how the duration of the spell affects the hazard rate.
We worked with a fully non-parametric specification of the hazard function.
In order to deal with unobserved heterogeneity (also referred to as ”frailty”
in the duration analysis literature), we worked with two different approaches.
The first one was a parametric specification, using a Gamma-distributed indi-
vidual heterogeneity term. We chose a Gamma distribution because Abbring
3We started by carrying out simple probit and multinomial logit regressions for the
decision to drop out of an apprenticeship. Results are available on request.
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and van den Berg (2007) have shown that for exponential mixtures, the dis-
tribution of heterogeneity among survivors converges rapidly to a Gamma
distribution. However, a test of the null hypothesis that the unobserved het-
erogeneity variance component is equal to zero could not be rejected. The
second approach was a non-parametric specification following the approach
by Heckman and Singer (1984). In this model, where we modeled the non-
parametric unobserved heterogeneity using two mass points, we could not
reject the null hypothesis that the mass point for type 2 is statistically no
different to the mass point for type 1. Hence, we present only the results
that do not take into account unobserved individual heterogeneity.4
Competing Risks Model
In order to estimate a discrete-time competing risks model, we need to make
assumptions about the shape of the hazard rate within each time interval be-
cause this shape cannot be identified from the data at hand. The literature
up tp now has worked with several different approaches, either dealing with
assumptions on the timing of transitions (see Narendrenathan and Stewart
1993) or with assumptions on destination-specific densities or hazard rates
(see, for example, Dolton and van der Klaauw 1999). We assume constant
within-interval destination-specific hazard rates (an approach used by Roed
and Zhang 2005) and use the fact that the likelihood function for small
interval hazards in this case approaches a much simpler likelihood for the
estimation. The likelihood is then given by
L = (LA)δ
A
(LB)δ
B
(LC)δ
C
(LD)1−δ
A−δB−δC (2)
where the δ’s denote destination-specific censoring indicators and the L’s
denote the destination-specific likelihood contributions. Following Allison
(1982), we assume a particular functional form for the destination-specific
hazards and get the following likelihood contribution for an individual with
spell length j:
L =
[
exp(β′AX)
1 + exp(β′AX) + exp(β
′
BX + exp(β
′
CX)
]δA
×
[
exp(β′BX)
1 + exp(β′AX) + exp(β
′
BX + exp(β
′
CX)
]δB
×
[
exp(β′CX)
1 + exp(β′AX) + exp(β
′
BX + exp(β
′
CX)
]δC
×
4It should also be kept in mind that these models are also ”frail” in a statistical sense,
meaning that the introduction of a possibly misspecified term that aims at capturing
unobserved heterogeneity can lead to even more serious distortions than ignoring it (see,
for example, Arulampalam and Stewart 1995 or Narendranathan and Stewart 1993).
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[
1
1 + exp(β′AX) + exp(β
′
BX + exp(β
′
CX)
](1−δA−δB−δC)
×
j−1∏
k=1
[
1
1 + exp(β′AX) + exp(β
′
BX) + exp(β
′
CX)
]
(3)
This is the same likelihood than the one for a multinomial logit model and
can be estimated with re-organised data (Jenkins 1995). We used the fact
that there is quite a substantial number of apprentices whose contract was
terminated due to bankruptcy of their training firm. This enables us to treat
them as a control group, assuming that they would not have terminated their
apprenticeship without the bankruptcy.
The next section presents background information, our data sources and some
descriptive statistics.
4 Background and Data
Our empirical analysis of dropout and changing behavior of apprentices is
based on a survey of the German Federal Institute for Vocational Education
(Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung) in 2002.5 Its main advantage is that it
allows us to distinguish the three different possible revision decisions very
clearly. In addition, it contains extensive information on the reasons for
the youths’ decision to terminate their apprenticeship. There are several
questions that allow us to analyze possible impact factors that have never
been used in previous research on the topic, such as the importance of exam
nerves or financial distress.
Further questions include information on the current status of the former
apprentices, on their educational background, on the year in which they
terminated their contract, on respondents’ gender and if they have non-native
parents. The data set also includes information on the regional provenance of
respondents that enabled us to add statistical information from Germany’s
regional statistics and from the federal employment agency’s statistics on the
regions of origin.
59000 questionnaires were sent out to youths who had dissolved their apprenticeship
contract in 2001/2002. 2323 questionnaires were returned, but only a smaller number
could be used for this work, e.g. because vital information was missing. As the focus of
this research is on revision decisions, we also excluded the youths whose apprenticeship
contract was terminated before they started their apprenticeship.
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4.1 Institutions
Firm-provided apprenticeship training is still one of the most important ways
of entering the labour market for youths in the German-speaking countries
(Ryan 2001). In Germany, for example, 58 % of all school leavers started an
apprenticeship in 2005, and about 20% of youths decided not to complete
their apprenticeship, but decided to revise their educational choice.
After their school graduation, the youths in Germany who want to con-
tinue their education can either study at universities or polytechnics (Fach-
hochschulen) if they hold the necessary qualification, enter dual apprentice-
ship training or go to full-time vocational schools (Berufsfachschule).6 There
is of course also the possibility to enter the labor market directly after school
without apprenticeship training. In the short run, this can be an attractive
option for the youths because the typical wage for an unskilled worker is
considerably higher than for an apprentice.
The focus of this work is on revising educational decisions in dual vocational
training. It consists of in-firm training at the workplace and classes at a
vocational school (Berufsschule). At the moment, there are nearly 350 state-
approved occupations for which apprenticeship training is available. They
last between 2 and 3.5 years. The apprenticeships are of general nature
because they finish with a recognized degree. Winkelmann (1996) and Ko-
rpi and Mertens (2003) both find evidence for the importance of general,
transferable skills from an apprenticeship as compared to firm-specific hu-
man capital. Apprentices earn a small wage paid by their training firms, and
youths get their training place either on their own initiative or through the
intermediation of the local employment agency or other institutions.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
The following section presents some interesting descriptive features of the
data set. We provide complete summary statistics in Appendix A.
Timing and educational choice after terminations of apprenticeship contracts
are similar to previous studies. A majority of contracts was terminated
during the first year of the apprenticeship (63%). Late terminations (3rd
and 4th year) are quite uncommon. Nearly 80 % of all youths decided to
continue their education, but one fifth decided to quit the educational system
and work as unskilled workers or were unemployed.
A closer look reveals more interesting descriptive results: female teenagers
drop out from the training system less often. This lower level is outweighed by
6These schools exist, inter alia, for training in technical, health-related or business-
related occupations. Some examples are chemical-technical assistants, or nurses.
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a higher percentage of changers among the girls, while the level of upgraders
is similar for both sexes.
Table 1: Choice by Gender
Males Females
Changer 71.86% 76.69%
Upgrader 6.44% 6.76%
Dropouts 21.70% 16.55%
n 931 858
A well-known result shows up for the previous level of schooling:7 the higher
it is, the lower is the youths’ risk of dropping out from the schooling system.
While 40 % of teenagers without any school-leaving certificate dropped out,
only 7% of the ones holding an Abitur did so. Inversely, they chose much
more often to upgrade, probably also due to the fact that they are the only
ones among the respondents who can enter university directly.
Table 2: Choice by prior level of schooling
None Hauptschule Realschule Fachabitur Abitur
Changers 55.17% 71.69% 79.09% 78.72% 67.53%
Upgraders 3.45% 2.25% 6.46% 11.7% 26.62%
Dropouts 41.38% 26.06% 14.44% 9.57% 5.84%
n 58 756 727 94 154
Finally, a look at the choice of terminating youths depending on the timing
of their termination of contract shows that the early terminations seem to
be less problematic than the late ones: while only 16% of the terminations
during probation time led to a dropout, 37% of the terminations during the
third year did so. This result is mirrored by the development of changing
behavior, which decreases heavily for the later terminations. These later
terminations of apprenticeship contracts seem to lead to more problems.
7The German schooling system tracks pupil into three different schools after 4 or 6 years
of primary school. The lower secondary school (Hauptschule) lasts 5 years while the middle
secondary school (Realschule) lasts 6 years and the upper secondary school (Gymnasium)
lasts either 8 or 9 years. The latter is the only type of school whose graduates are allowed
to study at a university. However, there are also various possibilities to gain a Fachabitur
(that allows its holders to study only in a certain field) or Fachhochschulreife (in order to
study at a polytechnic) outside the Gymnasium.
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Table 3: Choice by Timing
Probation First year Second year Third year Fourth year
Changers 74.39% 76.03% 77.13% 60.13% 40.00%
Upgraders 9.42% 7.39% 3.74% 2.61% 6.67%
Dropouts 16.20% 16.58% 19.13% 37.25% 53.33%
n 531 609 481 153 15
As already mentioned, the data set contains information on the regional ori-
gin of respondents and allows to match regional-level information. Patterns
of behavior across the regions vary remarkably, but neither according to the
type of chamber (chamber of commerce vs. chamber of crafts) nor accord-
ing to the location (east vs. west, north vs. south). The following table
summarizes the inter-regional differences.
Table 4: Choice by Region of Origin
Aachen Augsburg Darmstadt Flensburg
Changers 73.05% 78.50% 61.36% 77.38%
Upgraders 5.39% 5.21% 11.36% 4.76%
Dropouts 21.56% 16.29% 27.27% 17.86%
n 167 307 44 168
Frankfurt/O. Freiburg Gera Karlsruhe
Changers 77.98% 77.84% 84.85% 76.64%
Upgraders 4.59% 11.98% 3.03% 6.54%
Dropouts 17.43% 10.18% 12.12% 16.82%
n 109 167 33 107
Kiel Krefeld Leipzig Osnabrueck
Changers 70.80% 59.78% 79.37% 78.02%
Upgraders 5.47% 12.85% 6.35% 2.2%
Dropouts 23.72% 27.37% 14.29% 19.78%
n 274 179 63 91
Rostock Entire Sample
Changers 75.00% 74.18%
Upgraders 3.75% 6.6%
Dropouts 21.25% 19.23%
n 80 1789
Dropout rates are highest in Darmstadt and Rostock, while they are lowest
in Freiburg and Gera. The thickness of regional labor markets could provide
an explanation for the different dropout rates. We will test this hypothesis
in the empirical part of our paper.
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4.3 Selection and Construction of Variables
Several questions in the questionnaire can be used as proxies for direct and
indirect costs and benefits of educational choices in order to test our em-
pirical implications. Three of the questions aim at capturing the perceived
long-term benefits of an apprenticeship: they ask for the importance of bad
employment prospects after the apprenticeship, bad income and bad career
prospects, respectively. Exam nerves are a form of short-term indirect costs
due to stress and perceived mental overstrain of school. Respondents were
also asked directly for financial distress as a reason for termination of the ap-
prenticeship contract. More than 30% of the ex-apprentices who named this
reason were employed as unskilled workers, compared to only 12 % among
those who did not have financial problems. This provides descriptive evidence
for the possible importance of financial distress as a form of opportunity cost
of an apprenticeship. We also included a measure for another form of non-
monetary cost: being a girl in a male occupation or, vice versa, a boy in a
female occupation that we measured as being trained in an occupation with
on average more than 60% apprentices of the other gender. The higher cost
could be due to the fact that youths without peers of the same sex are more
often the victims of bullying at work (see, for instance, Litzcke 2003). Finally,
the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BiBB) gathers
data on the average salary that the apprentices are paid (Ausbildungsver-
guetungen), while the state-level statistical offices compile statistics on the
average salaries for workers, depending on their skill-level and the industry
sector where they are working.8 From these two variables, we constructed a
measure of the opportunity cost of an apprenticeship training, namely, the
relative wage of apprentices as compared to unskilled workers. We expect all
these cost-related variables to lead to higher hazards of dropping out.
The prior level of schooling of respondents should also influence their costs of
finishing an apprenticeship. Individuals with a higher level of prior schooling
should have less problems in school and learn more easily, leading to lower
costs of the apprenticeship. We included four dummies for respondents’
school leaving certificates (from Hauptschule, Realschule, and Gymnasium,
as well as the ones who hold a Fachabitur), using the ones without any cer-
tificate as a baseline category. We expect respondents with a higher school
leaving certificate to drop out less often because they should incur lower costs
for an apprenticeship. Possibly, they also had a larger set of choices for an
apprenticeship available and consequently, they should end up in a better
match. This should also lead to lower dropout hazards, and to higher haz-
8However, these average salaries for unskilled workers are not available for all federal
states and industrial sectors, reducing our sample size by approximately one third.
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ards of changing and upgrading.
Our theoretical considerations predict higher incentives to invest in human
capital in thicker labor markets. The thickness of a labor market cannot
be captured directly, but there are different measures that can be used in
order to proxy it. As a spatial bound, we just took the size of the respective
Chamber’s area. The relative immobility of apprentices can be seen as a
justification for this simplifying assumption. On the supply side, we used
the density of the working age population between 15 and 65. On the la-
bor market demand side, we took the local unemployment rate as a proxy.9
Additionally, the availability of public transport and traffic routes within
each Chamber area should also influence the size of a local labor market.
Commuting should be much easier in areas where there is a better transport
network disposable because more jobs can be reached within reasonable time
spans. We included the ”population accessible by public transport within
one hour” as a measure of transport smoothness. We expect higher hazards
of dropping out in thinner local labor markets.
As the descriptive results in earlier studies showed, various other variables
could possibly influence dropout and changing decisions. Hence, we also in-
cluded all the information on socioeconomic status of respondents that was
available as control variables. We also included four dummies for the field of
training as a substitute for industry sector information: technical, business-
related, crafts and ”simple” (mostly in services) occupations because there
seem to be differences in dropout behavior across the fields (see Alda 2003).
On the firm side, we included the available information on firm size (in four
groups).
As a last group of regressors, we used information from the regional employ-
ment centers (Arbeitsagenturen) on the labour market for apprentices and on
the numbers of youths participating in labor market measures. The employ-
ment centers gather information on registered apprenticeship-seeking youths
and on registered open apprenticeship places, and calculate a supply-demand
ratio (the number of offered apprenticeship places per 100 apprenticeship
seekers). However, as the employment centers can only use registered num-
bers for their calculations, these numbers do not give a complete picture of
regional apprenticeship markets.10 Many places are filled directly without
the intermediation of the job centre and are therefore not included in the
centres’ statistics. These regressors are intended to control for regional dif-
ferences in the labor market for apprentices. Riphahn (2002) and Wolter and
Mu¨hlemann (2006) both provide evidence for the importance of regional-level
9Results did not change when we used the youth unemployment rate instead.
10See, for instance, Ulrich (2006) for a more complete discussion of the topic.
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impact factors in vocational education, for employers as well as for youths.
Finally, we included a measure that captures the incidence of non-firm-
provided training in full-time vocational schools (ausserbetriebliche Ausbil-
dung). It is an additional control for conditions on the local labor market
for apprentices. We expect both variables to lead to lower dropout hazards
because matches should be better when there are more choices available or
when firms can pick the best (and probably most motivated) candidates for
an apprenticeship.
Detailed information on all variables and data sources can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Simple Hazards
The following table displays results for our simple hazard rate estimations
in various model specifications. The dependent variable takes the value of 1
if the individual dropped out of apprenticeship training and 0 else (i.e., he
or she either stayed in the educational system or is a bankruptcy victim).
***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1 %, 5%, and 10 %, respectively.
Standard errors are given in brackets. These estimations include controls
for the field of apprenticeship and the firm size and various regional-level
impact factors, but the estimated coefficients are not reported in this table.
However, the complete results are available upon request.11
11Additional results for logistic (proportional odds) estimations of the same model con-
firmed our results, as well as a sensitivity check where we removed various regional-level
variables from the estimation equations. The results for these additional estimations again
confirm our results and are can be found in Appendix C.
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Table 5: Simple Hazard Rates
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
d1 0.111*** 0.128* 0.118** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.037***
[0.072] [0.159] [0.102] [0.015] [0.022] [0.018]
d2 0.280* 0.466 0.246 0.074*** 0.079*** 0.062***
[0.182] [0.575] [0.211] [0.026] [0.040] [0.031]
d3 0.668 1.246 0.575 0.134*** 0.150*** 0.113***
[0.454] [1.620] [0.514] [0.048] [0.077] [0.056]
d4 1.751 8.574 1.075 0.347*** 0.757 0.196***
[1.288] [12.223] [1.022] [0.135] [0.412] [0.106]
d5 2.305 1.788 0.642 1.767 0.415
[2.127] [1.938] [0.341] [1.767] [0.282]
non-native parents 1.273 1.953 1.178 1.388* 1.188 1.475
[0.322] [0.918] [0.362] [0.268] [0.425] [0.349]
appr.wage/wage unskilled 0.030*** 0.008* 0.030***
[0.033] [0.022] [0.039]
female 0.938 0.824
[0.234] [0.146]
appr. in occupation 0.941 0.874 0.9 0.877
with > 60% females [0.181] [0.170] [0.137] [0.135]
appr. in occupation 1.279 1.252 1.193 1.175
with > 60% males [0.310] [0.315] [0.208] [0.209]
school dropout 1.707* 2.488 1.539 1.754** 1.705 1.849**
[0.537] [1.560] [0.563] [0.406] [0.658] [0.538]
Realschule 0.587*** 0.515** 0.567** 0.582*** 0.579*** 0.586***
[0.104] [0.152] [0.136] [0.079] [0.115] [0.111]
Fachabitur 0.203*** 0.464 0.171*** 0.066*** 0.266**
[0.108] [0.268] [0.080] [0.068] [0.142]
Abitur 0.196*** 0.199** 0.161* 0.284*** 0.243*** 0.343**
[0.118] [0.151] [0.166] [0.100] [0.122] [0.181]
bad prospects 1.126 0.911 1.329 0.826 1.782 0.616
[0.503] [0.922] [0.715] [0.301] [1.001] [0.299]
bad income prosp. 1.945** 2.913** 1.428 1.678** 2.578** 1.413
[0.581] [1.482] [0.585] [0.398] [0.972] [0.453]
bad career prosp. 0.8 0.993 0.732 0.837 0.281* 1.205
[0.400] [1.029] [0.452] [0.321] [0.208] [0.533]
exam nerves 1.151 1.419 1.15 1.159 0.882 1.223
[0.326] [0.864] [0.381] [0.239] [0.311] [0.324]
financial distress 2.332*** 2.649** 2.259*** 1.847*** 1.864* 1.766**
[0.527] [1.278] [0.600] [0.331] [0.600] [0.396]
Observations 2329 818 1439 3879 1785 2094
Log Likelihood -566.18873 -182.98222 -366.61294 -978.39857 -395.14262 -567.21845
Remarks females only males only females only males only
Models I - III are estimations including a measure for the financial incentive
to drop out represented by the ratio between the apprenticeship wage and the
regional wage for unskilled workers in the same sector, for the entire sample
(I), females (II) and males (III). Models IV - VI exclude the information
on the financial incentive (because this information is not available for all
sectors and regions), and again, estimation coefficients presented here are for
the entire sample (IV), females only (V), and males only (IV).
In this table, we present hazard ratios (exponentiated coefficients). The ef-
fect of the regressor of interest on the hazard is significantly positive if the
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hazard ratio is significantly larger than one and significantly negative if the
hazard ratio is significantly smaller than one.
We start the discussion of our estimation results with the results for timing of
the dropout decision. It turns out that individuals who terminated their ap-
prenticeship during probation time are significantly less likely to drop out in
all model specifications. An early termination of the apprenticeship contract
seems to lead to less difficulties of staying within the educational system.
The coefficient signs on cost- and benefit-related regressors show some em-
pirical evidence for the predictions of our theoretical considerations. With
respect to respondents’ prior level of schooling, we find the descriptive find-
ings confirmed. Individuals with a higher previous level of schooling are more
likely to stay within the educational system, either as apprentices in another
firm or as full-time students again. This could be due to lower costs of learn-
ing, but also to a higher level of awareness for the future consequences of
dropping out. On the other hand, school dropouts are significantly more
likely to drop out from apprenticeship training as well in estimations for the
two largest samples (Models I and III) and for males in Model VI.
One of the short-term cost measures also shows a significantly positive co-
efficient sign. Individuals who said that financial distress was a reason for
terminating their contract are significantly more likely to drop out. At the
same time, higher apprenticeship wages relative to wages for unskilled work-
ers in the same sector lead to lower hazards of dropping out. This ratio
can be seen as a measure for the opportunity cost of completing an appren-
ticeship (and not working as an unskilled worker), and both results can be
seen as a hint that the dropouts care more about financial issues than the
non-dropouts. Also, individuals who said that bad income prospects were
the reason for terminating their apprenticeship are significantly more likely
to drop out, and this result seems to be driven by the females in the sample
(the corresponding coefficients in the male-only estimations are not signifi-
cant).
Firm size dummies were included in the regressions, but they showed only
significant coefficients for the largest firms (over 500 employees) and firms
between 10 and 49 employees in the two models with the largest sample
sizes (Model I and Model IV). In both cases, apprentices have a significantly
higher hazard of dropping out.
Dummies for the field of occupation (crafts, technical, business-related and
simple service occupations) were also included, where we found that appren-
tices in technical occupations have significantly lower hazards to drop out
in models I, IV, V, and V. These occupations are often quite demanding,
and the result could be due to the fact that apprentices who had a place in
such an apprenticeship are more able and subsequently have less problems to
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find a new place. Surprisingly, none of the regional impact factors shows a
significant impact on the hazard of dropping out of apprenticeship training.
In order to uncover possible differences in behavior across the different choices
after terminating the apprenticeship contract, we now turn to estimation re-
sults for a competing risks specification.
5.2 Competing Risks
The following table displays results for our competing risks estimations,
where the control group are those apprentices whose contract was termi-
nated because of bankruptcy of their firm. The different states into which a
transition is possible are changing, upgrading and dropping out. ***, **, and
* denote significance levels of 1 %, 5%, and 10 %, respectively. Again, we
present exponentiated coefficients that can be interpreted as hazard ratios
and results for a model with (I) and without (II) the financial incentive.12
12Additional estimations for a complementary log-log specification of the model (as-
suming that transitions in the different choices can only occur at the boundary of time
intervals) confirmed the results and can also be found in Appendix C.
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Table 6: Competing Risks Estimates
change I change II upgrade I upgrade II dropout I dropout II
d1 35.270*** 0.74 3.021 0.029*** 1.513 0.078***
[16.307] [0.164] [3.243] [0.017] [1.102] [0.030]
d2 78.286*** 1.4 6.609* 0.050*** 4.842** 0.158***
[37.403] [0.316] [7.356] [0.030] [3.604] [0.061]
d3 231.608*** 3.115*** 11.526** 0.062*** 19.547*** 0.406**
[118.064] [0.738] [13.647] [0.040] [15.329] [0.160]
d4 914.420*** 6.293*** 14.078* 0.091*** 118.213*** 1.72
[542.346] [1.908] [22.350] [0.079] [103.138] [0.765]
d5 351.130*** 3.984* 0 0 136.704*** 3.085
[375.678] [3.004] [0.000] [0.000] [155.416] [2.248]
appr. wage/ 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
wage unskilled [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
non-native parents 0.824 0.892 0.724 0.958 1.197 1.307
[0.161] [0.129] [0.364] [0.342] [0.337] [0.279]
female 1.204 1.442*** 0.584 0.597* 0.988 0.969
[0.191] [0.161] [0.214] [0.166] [0.269] [0.185]
appr. in occupation 0.955 0.972 0.536 0.524** 0.909 0.911
with > 60% females [0.131] [0.104] [0.204] [0.152] [0.194] [0.152]
appr. in occupation 0.641*** 0.787** 1.159 1.107 1.037 1.023
with > 60% males [0.105] [0.086] [0.437] [0.312] [0.280] [0.194]
school dropout 1.275 1.239 1.375 1.811 2.113** 2.311***
[0.397] [0.285] [1.467] [1.380] [0.788] [0.619]
Realschule 1.003 1.229** 2.305** 2.431*** 0.567*** 0.630***
[0.120] [0.106] [0.823] [0.701] [0.110] [0.092]
Fachabitur 0.992 0.902 2.637* 3.374*** 0.175*** 0.241***
[0.241] [0.162] [1.516] [1.405] [0.102] [0.097]
Abitur 1.129 1.237 9.562*** 12.251*** 0.213** 0.345***
[0.264] [0.195] [4.174] [3.970] [0.134] [0.128]
bad prospects 1.706* 1.37 0.491 1.042 1.517 1.026
[0.514] [0.302] [0.419] [0.592] [0.731] [0.398]
bad income prosp. 1.242 1.652*** 0.944 1.242 2.227** 2.155***
[0.321] [0.299] [0.576] [0.572] [0.780] [0.586]
bad career prosp. 1.139 1.236 2.554* 2.015 0.707 0.795
[0.354] [0.282] [1.434] [0.907] [0.390] [0.335]
exam nerves 0.649 0.407*** 0.409 0.212 1.034 0.892
[0.194] [0.087] [0.427] [0.217] [0.349] [0.215]
financial distress 0.565** 0.692** 0.828 0.598 2.320*** 1.755***
[0.158] [0.127] [0.623] [0.362] [0.645] [0.371]
local perc. of youth 87.250*** 42.736*** 54.156* 6.977 6.314 1.878
in out-of-firm train. [73.320] [26.192] [111.488] [12.515] [9.165] [2.082]
local population 9.284 0.855 2,663.387* 3.671 31.716 0.419
density [16.776] [1.083] [12,585.145] [13.563] [92.836] [0.886]
local sup-dem ratio on 1,833.306** 584.564** 302.831 51.373 0.199 0.936
job market for appr. [6,551.418] [1,485.579] [3,054.881] [403.159] [1.310] [4.073]
local density of 0.067** 0.895 0.003 0.781 0.098 5.52
public transport [0.090] [0.839] [0.011] [2.151] [0.217] [8.806]
local unemployment 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0 0.1
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.450]
n 2394 3991 2394 3991 2394 3991
Log Likelihood -1958.9199 -3535.6305 -1958.9199 -3535.6305 -1958.9199 -3535.6305
Duration effects are captured by the dummy variables on the period of time
in which the apprenticeship contract was terminated (i.e. probation, remain-
der of first year, second year, third year, fourth year). These effects are
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non-monotonic for changers and for upgraders, and this result supports our
decision to use a non-parametric specification of the baseline hazard.
Being female significantly affects the transition rate into changing and up-
grading, but not into dropping out in the model specifications without includ-
ing the wage ratio. More precisely, females have significantly higher hazards
to transit into changing and significantly lower hazards to transit into up-
grading.
The previous level of schooling affects the transition rates into upgrading and
into dropping out, and into changing for Realschule graduates in the larger
sample, where Realschule graduates are more likely to change. In addition,
individuals with a higher level of previous schooling have significantly higher
hazards of upgrading and significantly lower hazards of dropping out. School
dropouts, on the other hand, have a significantly higher hazard of dropping
out from apprenticeship training as well. This confirms our results from the
simple hazard rate estimation and previous research on the topic.
We now turn to estimation results on the field of individuals’ first appren-
ticeship. Individuals who started their first apprenticeship in a technical
occupation have significantly lower hazards of changing and dropping out
in both specifications. The same result appears for individuals with a first
apprenticeship in a crafts occupation (for changing in the smaller model and
for dropping out in the larger one). Finally, individuals who started their
first apprenticeship in a business-related occupation have significantly lower
hazards of changing in the larger sample.
With respect to the questions on reasons why individuals terminated their
first apprenticeship prematurely, we find that the hazards of dropping out are
significantly higher for those who said thad bad income perspectives were a
reason for them to terminate their first apprenticeship. The same holds true
for the hazard of changing, but only in the larger sample. Those who said
bad prospects in general were a main reason to terminate have a significantly
higher hazard of ending up with a change, but only in the smaller sample.
The ones who named bad career prospects as a main reason have (somewhat
logically) a higher hazard of upgrading, because a higher level of schooling
or a university degree offer of course better career options.
Unlike in the simple hazard specifications, several regional-level impact fac-
tors now significantly affect transition rates. A higher local supply-demand
ratio on the job market for apprentices leads to significantly higher hazards
for changing behavior: when there are more places available, it is of course
much easier to find a new apprenticeship place. The higher the number of
youth in out-of-firm training, the higher is the hazard of changing. This could
be due to the fact that typically only the better school leavers get places in
dual training in regions with a high incidence of out-of-firm training. Con-
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sequently, they probably also have less problems to change and find another
apprenticeship place.
With respect to the local unemployment rate, we find that the hazards of
changing and upgrading are significantly lower, the higher the unemployment
rate is. This result could be due to individuals’ not perceiving the benefits of
a completed education in a labor market with a high unemployment rate. It
also confirms the theoretical predictions from Wheeler’s (2001) model that
predicts less incentives to invest in human capital in thinner local labor mar-
kets.
The result that dropouts seem to care too much about short-term financial
issues from the simple hazard rate estimations is confirmed by the competing
risks estimation results. It is especially disturbing that youths who named
financial distress and bad income prospects as the reason for dissolving their
apprenticeship contract have significantly higher hazards of dropping out:
this decision will probably worsen their financial situation considerably in
the long term, even if they are better off in the short term with the higher
salary of an unskilled worker as compared to their apprenticeship wage. This
result seems to suggest that dropouts suffer from a lack of awareness for the
long-term consequences of their dropout decision: their discount rate for fu-
ture payoffs is simply too high.
The overall results seem to suggest that there are indeed remarkable differ-
ences in behavior across the different educational choices and that it is useful
to distinguish between them instead of focusing exclusively on dropouts.
6 Conclusion
In the present paper, we analyzed revisions of youths’ educational choices.
Unlike previous research, we did not focus exclusively on dropping out as
one revision of an educational decision, but we considered also the choices of
changing and upgrading. Using theoretical considerations from human cap-
ital theory and matching theory, we tested the hypotheses that cost-related
impact factors should be more important for the dropouts, while the impor-
tance of bad matches should be higher for the changers. The upgraders should
possibly be underchallenged and change to a more demanding educational
choice. In addition, we expected stronger incentives to complete apprentice-
ship education in thicker local labor markets, where employment opportu-
nities after graduation are better, leading to better matches and hence to
higher benefits of a completed education. We used a data set on revisions of
educational choices in vocational education, where the different choices can
be distinguished very clearly.
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A simple hazard rate analysis of the decision to drop out vs. staying in the
educational system revealed a high importance of various monetary impact
factors. The fact of experiencing financial distress significantly increased the
hazard of dropping out, as well as stating bad income prospects as the main
reason to drop out of vocational education. Also, the lower the financial op-
portunity cost of an apprenticeship is (measured as the apprenticeship wage
relative to the wage for unskilled workers in the same sector), the lower is
the hazard of dropping out. These results could point toward the possi-
bility that dropouts are too much guided by monetary considerations when
deciding about their education. They also confirmed our hypothesis that
cost-related impact factors seem to be decisive for dropout decisions.
With respect to previous educational attainment, we find that individuals
with a higher level of previous schooling have lower hazards of dropping out.
This result confirms findings from earlier studies and could be due to at least
two different reasons: either lower costs of learning or better decision-making
abilities for more able individuals and confirm again our hypothesis.
In the competing risks estimations, we find additionally that various measures
of local labor market situation affect the hazards of transition in the differ-
ent states significantly. More precisely, more available places on the local
job market for apprentices lead to a higher hazard of changing and a higher
local unemployment rate leads to significantly lower hazards of changing and
upgrading. This result confirms our hypothesis that individuals should have
weaker incentives to invest in human capital in thinner local labor markets.
Revising an educational choice is not risky per se, but dropping out of the ed-
ucational system without a certificate that qualifies its holders for skilled jobs
and many further training possibilities is. Our results indicate that there are
indeed different determinants for the different educational choices and sev-
eral policy measures could be promising in order to avoid ”true” dropouts,
including increasing apprentices’ regional mobility in order to achieve better
matches between apprentices and firms and increasing youths’ awareness for
the long-term consequences of dropping out, including the foregone earnings
losses due to lower wages and higher unemployment risk for unskilled work-
ers.
Future research on the topic could either include an analysis of the conse-
quences of dropping out from vocational education using longitudinal datasets
or focusing on other possible impact factors, such as firm or instructor char-
acteristics.
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A Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
Table 7: Variables: Data Sources and Description
Name Scale Source
mig 1 = migration background BiBB
female 1 = female BiBB
boygirlsjob2 1 = boy in occupation with more than 60% females BiBB
girlboysjob2 1 = girl in occupation with more than 60% males BiBB
none 1 = no school leaving certificate BiBB
haupt 1 = Hauptschule graduate BiBB
real 1 = Realschule graduate BiBB
fachabi 1 = Fachabitur holder BiBB
abi 1 = Gymnasium graduate BiBB
firstyear 1 = contract termination during first year of apprenticeship BiBB
secondyear 1 = contract termination during second year of apprenticeship BiBB
thirdyear 1 = contract termination during third year of apprenticeship BiBB
fourthyear 1 = contract termination during fourth year of apprenticeship BiBB
business 1 = contract termination in business-related occupation BiBB
crafts 1 = contract termination in crafts occupation BiBB
technical 1 = contract termination in technical occupation BiBB
simple 1 = contract termination in simple (mostly service-related) occupation BiBB
under10 1 = firm size under 10 employees BiBB
betw1049 1 = firm size between 10 and 49 employees BiBB
betw5099 1 = firm size between 50 and 99 employees BiBB
betw100499 1 = firm size between 100 and 499 employees BiBB
over500 1 = firm size over 500 employees BiBB
badprospects 1 = bad prospects as a reason for termination BiBB
badincomeprospects 1 = bad income prospects as a reason for termination BiBB
badcareerpros 1 = bad career prospects as a reason for termination BiBB
examnerves 1 = exam nerves as a reason for termination BiBB
findistress 1 = financial distress as a reason for termination BiBB
percbue % of youths in full-time school for dually provided occupation Federal Employment Agency
labmarket2001 population between 15-65/surface Regional Statistics
supdem2001 supply-demand ratio on the labor market for apprentices Federal Employment Agency
accpop Accessible population with public transport within one hour INKAR
unempl01 unemployment rate Regional Statistics
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max n
1 = migration background .0786146 .2692103 0 1 1819
appr.wage/wage for unskilled worker .3209563 .0917546 0 .7892514 1059
1 = boy in occupation with more than 60% females .2242991 .4172346 0 1 1819
1 = girl in occupation with more than 60% males .2094557 .4070321 0 1 1819
1 = no school leaving certificate .0324354 .1772022 0 1 1819
1 = Realschule graduate .4106652 .4920898 0 1 1819
1 = Fachabitur holder .0522265 .2225446 0 1 1819
1 = Gymnasium graduate .0857614 .2800884 0 1 1819
1 = contract termination in business-related occupation .3018142 .4591713 0 1 1819
1 = contract termination in crafts occupation .2820231 .4501083 0 1 1819
1 = contract termination in technical occupation .2380429 .4260026 0 1 1819
1 = firm size between 10 and 49 employees .3457944 .4757574 0 1 1819
1 = firm size between 50 and 99 employees .1028037 .3037859 0 1 1819
1 = firm size between 100 and 499 employees .0934579 .2911532 0 1 1819
1 = firm size over 500 employees .0670698 .2502117 0 1 1819
1 = bad prospects as a reason for termination .0439802 .2051075 0 1 1819
1 = bad income prospects as a reason for termination .0615723 .2404432 0 1 1819
1 = bad career prospects as a reason for termination .0439802 .2051075 0 1 1819
1 = exam nerves as a reason for termination .0379329 .1910866 0 1 1819
1 = financial distress as a reason for termination .0538758 .2258344 0 1 1819
% of youths in full-time school for dually provided occupation .1520373 .1667809 .020776 .6169014 1819
working age population density .1857529 .1388806 .0547729 .5554956 1819
public transport density .2697383 .1897619 .0559182 .737625 1819
local unemployment rate .0890995 .045999 .0468462 .2008182 1819
B Additional Estimation Results
Table 9: Simple Hazard Rates, full results
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
during probation -2.963 -3.14 -2.933 -2.179 -2.097 -2.417
[0.657]*** [1.120]*** [0.889]*** [0.346]*** [0.489]*** [0.486]***
later first year -3.504 -3.224 -3.764 -2.996 -2.781 -3.359
[0.651]*** [1.089]*** [0.884]*** [0.348]*** [0.483]*** [0.490]***
second year -3.771 -3.512 -4.02 -3.317 -3.109 -3.685
[0.688]*** [1.173]*** [0.927]*** [0.348]*** [0.498]*** [0.485]***
third year -3.804 -2.848 -4.372 -3.141 -2.309 -3.899
[0.764]*** [1.359]** [1.008]*** [0.386]*** [0.531]*** [0.550]***
fourth year -3.917 -4.261 -3.027 -2.174 -3.66
[0.931]*** [1.119]*** [0.517]*** [0.875]** [0.673]***
non-native parents 0.202 0.279 0.205 0.295 0.152 0.378
[0.251] [0.457] [0.308] [0.192] [0.347] [0.235]
appr.wage/wage unsk. 1.076 1.116 0.995
[1.049] [2.191] [1.234]
female -0.049 -0.245
[0.246] [0.172]
appr. in occupation 0.027 -0.037 -0.045 -0.075
with > 60% females [0.189] [0.191] [0.150] [0.152]
appr. in occupation 0.318 0.229 0.263 0.233
with > 60% males [0.241] [0.247] [0.174] [0.176]
no school-leaving certificate 0.435 0.627 0.391 0.452 0.599 0.376
[0.311] [0.616] [0.366] [0.230]** [0.381] [0.292]
Realschule graduate -0.53 -0.573 -0.55 -0.632 -0.596 -0.628
[0.176]*** [0.283]** [0.236]** [0.134]*** [0.196]*** [0.187]***
holder of a Fachabitur -1.577 -0.726 -1.762 -2.588 -1.284
[0.526]*** [0.553] [0.463]*** [1.018]** [0.527]**
holder of an Abitur -1.878 -1.726 -2.194 -1.505 -1.445 -1.438
[0.600]*** [0.756]** [1.028]** [0.353]*** [0.479]*** [0.532]***
apprenticeship in 0.189 0.079 0.259 -0.028 -0.071 -0.102
business occupation [0.299] [0.411] [0.496] [0.173] [0.220] [0.299]
apprenticeship in 0.064 0.307 0.032 -0.24 -0.048 -0.38
crafts occupation [0.321] [0.518] [0.476] [0.180] [0.259] [0.264]
apprenticeship in 0.057 0.246 0.127 -0.393 -0.669 -0.374
technical occupation [0.331] [0.628] [0.476] [0.196]** [0.427] [0.263]
firm size betw. 0.265 0.572 0.152 0.261 0.467 0.121
10-49 employees [0.180] [0.310]* [0.228] [0.137]* [0.208]** [0.185]
firm size betw. 0.128 -0.352 0.226 0.207 -0.28 0.374
50-99 employees [0.264] [0.641] [0.305] [0.205] [0.399] [0.244]
firm size betw. 0.001 0.597 -0.299 0.285 0.516 0.124
100-499 employees [0.288] [0.458] [0.390] [0.209] [0.322] [0.277]
firm size over 0.325 0.609 0.119 0.501 0.558 0.416
500 employees [0.315] [0.498] [0.431] [0.231]** [0.378] [0.297]
bad prospects -0.18 -0.536 0.035 -0.343 0.218 -0.475
reason for termination [0.419] [0.880] [0.512] [0.356] [0.553] [0.475]
bad income prospects 0.646 0.812 0.452 0.393 0.743 0.249
reason for termination [0.297]** [0.504] [0.398] [0.240] [0.376]** [0.327]
bad career prospects -0.194 0.189 -0.371 -0.236 -1.155 0.083
reason for termination [0.474] [0.904] [0.594] [0.375] [0.723] [0.433]
exam nerves 0.34 0.379 0.372 0.47 0.274 0.501
reason for termination [0.282] [0.574] [0.334] [0.209]** [0.353] [0.267]*
financial distress 0.894 0.899 0.934 0.694 0.816 0.67
reason for termination [0.224]*** [0.473]* [0.264]*** [0.181]*** [0.319]** [0.226]***
local percentage of youth -1.761 0.676 -3.2 -2.057 0.117 -3.957
in out-of-firm training [1.380] [2.265] [1.806]* [1.033]** [1.554] [1.476]***
local population density -0.615 -4.399 -0.099 -0.97 1.173 -2.831
[2.679] [5.004] [3.318] [1.948] [3.403] [2.542]
local supply-demand ratio on the -7 -16.582 -0.026 -3.952 -2.056 -4.004
job market for apprentices [5.995] [10.989] [7.215] [3.957] [6.926] [5.028]
local density 1.499 4.002 1.14 1.737 0.037 3.192
of public transport [2.039] [3.823] [2.518] [1.470] [2.540] [1.925]*
local unemployment rate 7.569 0.465 12.883 9.509 -0.817 17.697
[5.603] [9.740] [7.312]* [4.115]** [6.870] [5.643]***
n 2329 818 1439 3879 1785 2094
LogL -624.5478 -220.9826 -388.74944 -1023.8992 -433.1368 -576.2081
Table 10: Simple Hazards, logit
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
d1 0.122*** 0.176 0.116** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.037***
[0.086] [0.231] [0.109] [0.016] [0.023] [0.019]
d2 0.32 0.687 0.249 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.062***
[0.226] [0.898] [0.234] [0.028] [0.043] [0.033]
d3 0.816 1.943 0.629 0.142*** 0.152*** 0.118***
[0.603] [2.692] [0.614] [0.055] [0.085] [0.062]
d4 2.473 22.794** 1.258 0.429** 1.071 0.221***
[1.989] [36.103] [1.309] [0.181] [0.651] [0.129]
d5 3.683 2.604 0.888 2.831 0.551
[3.986] [3.264] [0.578] [3.970] [0.441]
non-native parents 1.282 1.834 1.189 1.41 1.205 1.52
[0.356] [0.945] [0.399] [0.297] [0.460] [0.394]
appr.wage/wage unskilled 0.023*** 0.005* 0.025***
[0.027] [0.013] [0.035]
female 0.898 0.801
[0.243] [0.152]
appr. in occupation 0.925 0.866 0.905 0.876
with > 60% females [0.194] [0.181] [0.150] [0.145]
appr. in occupation 1.304 1.317 1.21 1.196
with > 60% males [0.344] [0.377] [0.228] [0.235]
school dropout 1.834* 2.532 1.623 1.981*** 2.033 1.984**
[0.661] [1.840] [0.674] [0.522] [0.910] [0.650]
Realschule 0.553*** 0.461** 0.530** 0.558*** 0.547*** 0.560***
[0.106] [0.154] [0.136] [0.081] [0.119] [0.113]
Fachabitur 0.176*** 0.428 0.151*** 0.055*** 0.237**
[0.101] [0.269] [0.074] [0.058] [0.135]
Abitur 0.178*** 0.164** 0.144* 0.269*** 0.228*** 0.323**
[0.110] [0.133] [0.151] [0.099] [0.119] [0.177]
business 1.236 1.166 1.266 0.876 0.781 0.887
[0.408] [0.566] [0.692] [0.166] [0.194] [0.289]
crafts 0.85 1.023 0.771 0.660** 0.911 0.537**
[0.303] [0.613] [0.407] [0.133] [0.268] [0.157]
technical 0.535* 0.884 0.523 0.508*** 0.397** 0.501**
[0.197] [0.626] [0.274] [0.110] [0.184] [0.145]
1 = firm size betw. 10-49 employees 1.407* 1.987* 1.257 1.267 1.604** 1.104
[0.283] [0.713] [0.316] [0.189] [0.372] [0.221]
1 = firm size betw. 50-99 employees 1.34 0.766 1.568 1.119 0.662 1.378
[0.391] [0.530] [0.529] [0.250] [0.293] [0.365]
1 = firm size betw. 100-499 employees 0.971 2.028 0.711 1.12 1.639 0.892
[0.311] [1.089] [0.301] [0.257] [0.602] [0.268]
1 = firm size over 500 employees 1.695 2.238 1.424 1.505 1.638 1.353
[0.591] [1.341] [0.672] [0.382] [0.715] [0.436]
1 = bad prospects 1.137 0.956 1.343 0.806 1.862 0.59
reason for termination [0.555] [1.017] [0.797] [0.315] [1.121] [0.308]
1 = bad income prospects 2.024** 3.335** 1.47 1.751** 2.855** 1.43
reason for termination [0.687] [1.945] [0.676] [0.462] [1.196] [0.504]
1 = bad career prospects 0.734 0.824 0.668 0.809 0.240* 1.233
reason for termination [0.398] [0.915] [0.447] [0.331] [0.190] [0.593]
1 = exam nerves 1.173 1.498 1.156 1.162 0.884 1.224
reason for termination [0.381] [1.075] [0.432] [0.272] [0.363] [0.363]
1 = financial distress 2.713*** 2.918* 2.563*** 2.009*** 2.048** 1.906**
reason for termination [0.715] [1.636] [0.781] [0.412] [0.748] [0.485]
local percentage of youth 1.182 13.439 0.263 0.558 2.232 0.142
in out-of-firm training [1.691] [33.426] [0.491] [0.617] [3.885] [0.221]
local population density 11.942 0.239 20.84 0.714 1.703 0.245
[34.378] [1.395] [73.827] [1.508] [6.373] [0.653]
local supply-demand ratio 0.037 0 39.883 0.295 0.975 0.463
on the job market for apprentices [0.236] [0.000] [313.102] [1.264] [7.466] [2.470]
local density of public transport 0.34 4.255 0.236 4.45 2.412 10.108
[0.737] [18.667] [0.628] [7.084] [6.713] [20.434]
local unemployment rate 0.176 0 63.907 25.877 0.016 11,056.14
[1.049] [0.000] [492.660] [116.069] [0.121] [66,415.128]
Observations 2329 818 1439 3879 1785 2094
Table 11: Competing Risks Model, complementary log-log
change I change II upgrade I upgrade II dropout I dropout II
d1 1.502*** -0.756*** -1.672* -4.231*** -1.966*** -3.209***
[0.315] [0.181] [0.966] [0.583] [0.617] [0.354]
d2 2.105*** -0.286 -1.229 -3.929*** -1.102* -2.726***
[0.328] [0.182] [1.000] [0.586] [0.626] [0.353]
d3 2.720*** 0.199 -1.216 -4.107*** -0.205 -2.138***
[0.344] [0.187] [1.056] [0.616] [0.649] [0.357]
d4 3.257*** 0.31 -1.963 -4.294*** 0.775 -1.213***
[0.384] [0.220] [1.462] [0.832] [0.702] [0.386]
d5 2.533*** -0.248 0.906 -0.656
[0.791] [0.534] [0.891] [0.525]
appr.wage/wage unskilled -5.535*** -6.033*** -4.419***
[0.518] [1.375] [1.001]
non-native parents -0.172 -0.124 -0.523 -0.123 0.257 0.328*
[0.159] [0.117] [0.530] [0.355] [0.246] [0.190]
female 0.174 0.319*** -0.561 -0.627** -0.031 -0.14
[0.123] [0.089] [0.344] [0.262] [0.242] [0.174]
appr. in occupation 0.023 0.019 -0.654* -0.669** -0.063 -0.09
with > 60% females [0.111] [0.087] [0.377] [0.282] [0.189] [0.151]
appr. in occupation -0.342*** -0.189** 0.311 0.206 0.205 0.109
with > 60% males [0.128] [0.085] [0.353] [0.266] [0.238] [0.172]
school dropout 0.148 0.024 0.267 0.472 0.515 0.531**
[0.242] [0.182] [1.048] [0.750] [0.314] [0.230]
Realschule 0.06 0.192*** 0.926*** 0.888*** -0.532*** -0.521***
[0.095] [0.069] [0.358] [0.289] [0.174] [0.134]
Fachabitur -0.022 -0.136 1.100* 1.352*** -1.616*** -1.634***
[0.206] [0.155] [0.561] [0.406] [0.535] [0.428]
Abitur 0.012 0.1 2.276*** 2.470*** -1.667*** -1.263***
[0.185] [0.125] [0.416] [0.313] [0.601] [0.354]
business -0.053 -0.159* 0.378 0.252 0.255 -0.071
[0.165] [0.093] [0.649] [0.312] [0.302] [0.173]
crafts -0.594*** -0.123 -0.431 -0.262 -0.158 -0.402**
[0.179] [0.101] [0.716] [0.399] [0.323] [0.184]
technical -0.786*** -0.169 -0.265 0.023 -0.597* -0.618***
[0.183] [0.105] [0.679] [0.348] [0.338] [0.200]
1 = firm size betw. 10-49 employees -0.139 -0.075 0.123 0.113 0.297 0.224
[0.102] [0.071] [0.328] [0.253] [0.181] [0.137]
1 = firm size betw. 50-99 employees -0.043 -0.164 0.875** 0.901*** 0.326 0.141
[0.151] [0.110] [0.395] [0.296] [0.262] [0.204]
1 = firm size betw. 100-499 employees -0.132 -0.196* -0.021 0.532* 0.094 0.171
[0.151] [0.118] [0.425] [0.314] [0.281] [0.205]
1 = firm size over 500 employees -0.029 -0.169 0.219 0.45 0.545* 0.427*
[0.172] [0.136] [0.439] [0.334] [0.316] [0.230]
1 = bad prospects 0.327 0.2 -0.932 -0.062 0.257 -0.085
reason for termination [0.240] [0.168] [0.816] [0.542] [0.418] [0.353]
1 = bad income prospects 0.101 0.329** -0.158 0.013 0.665** 0.558**
reason for termination [0.195] [0.135] [0.565] [0.430] [0.291] [0.234]
1 = bad career prospects 0.123 0.168 0.789 0.587 -0.4 -0.305
reason for termination [0.245] [0.174] [0.500] [0.411] [0.492] [0.387]
1 = exam nerves -0.342 -0.685*** -0.814 -1.291 0.182 0.197
reason for termination [0.248] [0.182] [1.025] [1.013] [0.277] [0.203]
1 = financial distress -0.688*** -0.401*** -0.13 -0.455 0.890*** 0.628***
reason for termination [0.234] [0.152] [0.737] [0.594] [0.222] [0.177]
local percentage of youth 3.358*** 2.825*** 1.776 0.237 0.033 -0.836
in out-of-firm training [0.632] [0.487] [2.004] [1.748] [1.294] [1.024]
local population density 0.582 -0.114 5.908 1.363 2.372 -0.581
[1.390] [1.011] [4.544] [3.605] [2.610] [1.925]
local supply-demand ratio 5.331* 4.736** -0.026 0.825 -4.193 -2.34
on the job market for apprentices [2.773] [2.051] [9.727] [7.592] [5.991] [3.931]
local density of public transport -1.19 -0.273 -3.925 -0.395 -1.138 1.449
[1.027] [0.746] [3.381] [2.685] [1.966] [1.458]
local unemployment rate -15.264*** -12.655*** -12.215 -5.233 -0.603 4.429
[2.795] [2.120] [8.709] [7.313] [5.404] [4.140]
Observations 2394 3991 2385 3975 2394 3991
